# Cities to be Tamed?
# Spatial Investigations across the Urban South

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Edited by

Francesco Chiodelli, Beatrice De Carli,
Maddalena Falletti and Lina Scavuzzo

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# CHAPTER EIGHT

# POWER IN SPACE: SPACE REGULATION AMIDST TECHNIQUES AND POLITICS IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH

FRANCESCO CHIODELLI AND LINA SCAVUZZO

## 1. Space and politics in the Global South

### 1.1 The politics of space

Many scholars have highlighted the fact that space is political – see, for instance, Henri Lefebvre (2000: 52-53): 'Space is not a pure scientific object outside both politics and ideology; it is always strategic and political'.[1] To be more precise, one can say that space, which is neutral in itself, is available for politically-orientated uses, and therefore, by extension, practices and disciplines aimed at regulating and shaping space (e.g. planning, architecture, and urban design)[2] inevitably have a 'political component'. This 'political component' is twofold: it is both substantive and procedural.

First, actions involving the subdivision, allocation, moulding, and building on land have a substantive political character: they always influence rights, values, and power relations to some extent. This influence may be direct or indirect, or intentional or unintentional, but in all cases, the effect of spatially localising functions, buildings, and populations is a 'relative redistribution'. The distribution of costs and gains, windfalls and wipe-outs, and duties and rights is not equal and impartial: someone is

[1] See also Lefebvre (1991; 1996; 2000).

[2] In this paper, we particularly focus on planning, as do many chapters in this second part of the volume. Nevertheless, our arguments might also be extended (at least partially) to architecture and urban design.

advantaged, someone else is disadvantaged;[3] in the competition for urban space, someone 'wins', while another 'loses'.[4] It is this distribution that is substantively political. In fact, as Mouffe (2005: 10, 18) states, 'properly political questions always involve decisions which require us to make a choice between conflicting alternatives. […] Things could always be otherwise and therefore every order is predicated on the exclusion of other possibilities'.

Second, space regulation and moulding (and spatial planning in particular) have a procedurally political character. The main reason for this is that spatial planning is a component of government, and therefore it is always produced within a process that is characterised (in part) by a political rationale. 'It could be said that planning has its own "grammar", in other words a group of technical and scientific rules, but that it does not have its own "logic"': the logic of planning is delineated by political decisions' (Mazza, 2009: 133).[5]

The existence of this connection between space regulation and the political sphere has long been well recognized. However, today in the Global North, this connection is sometimes neither evident nor explicit; conversely, it is in the Global South that this connection is usually clear. This is the case, for instance, with contexts in which land is the subject of a (sometimes violent) conflict among antagonistic ethnic groups – space regulation is a central means whereby this conflict is governed, for

[3] In planning 'there is inevitably a *relative* redistribution, if not always an absolute one. Some groups, after all, have *not* traffic removed from their *door steps*, some have *not* a new park provided near their homes. Since there will always be relative redistribution and sometimes absolute redistribution, then, it seems possible to conclude that it can hardly make sense to adopt land-use planning at all, unless we have first decided what social redistribution we wish to achieve' (Reade, 1987: 8). See also Weaver and Babcock (1979).

[4] Generally speaking, we might maintain that land use planning distributes 'urban citizenship quotas' – that is, duties and rights and advantages and disadvantages relating to urban life; in so doing, it contributes to the determination of the inhabitants' urban citizenship (see Chiodelli, 2013). In this sense, planning 'has a political end above all: a (re)designing of citizenship that welds strategies of social and spatial control into a single process. […] The (re)designing of citizenship is, wittingly or unwittingly, the true aim of the plan' (Mazza, 2009: 125).

[5] To sum up, we can state that because space regulation and moulding has both a substantive and procedural political character, the concept of the political (Schmitt, 1996; Mouffe, 2005) is an element of planning. 'By "the political" I mean the dimension of antagonism which I take to be constitutive of human societies, while by "politics" I mean the set of practices and institutions through which an order is created, organizing human coexistence in the context of conflictuality provided by the political' (Mouffe, 2005: 9).

instance through an alteration of the spatial distribution of these groups (Bollens, 2000). In this case, space regulation functions essentially as a tool for social control. Many of the contributions in this second part of the book vividly highlight different aspects of this issue: Erez Tzfadia's chapter on Israeli settlement projects in occupied Palestinian territories; Scott Bollens' chapter on planning as a means of regulating power relations and group rights in South Africa and Lebanon; Olivier Legrand and Oren Yiftachel's chapter on the connection between planning and informality with reference to the evolution of antagonistic ethno-national groups in Sarajevo and Jerusalem; and Hamed Khosravi's chapter on the political role of architecture in Teheran following Reza Shah's 1921 coup d'état. However, the interrelation between space regulation and the political sphere can also materialise in another form: as sovereignty. In this second case, for instance, planning determines what is formal and what is outside formality, what is legal and what is outside legality: 'it is planning that inscribes the informal by designating some activities as authorized and others as unauthorized, by demolishing slums while granting legal status to equally illegal suburban developments' (Roy, 2009: 10).[6] In the literature on the urban South, this relation between space regulation and the political sphere in terms of sovereignty is usually highlighted with reference to informal settlements. This is not always the case, however, as some of the chapters in this volume reveal. This is the case, for instance, of Erez Tzfadia's chapter dealing with the rule of law in the production of Israeli colonial space in the West Bank; Legrand and Yiftachel's chapter focusing on the concept of grey space, that is, liminal areas between legality and illegality; and Ignacio Ulloa's chapter on the interpretation of the informal practices of grassroots organisations as (insurgent) planning actions, regardless of formal planning.

It is precisely the political nature, significance, and effect of space regulation and moulding that represents the *fil rouge* of this second part of the book. Each essay deals with this topic in a different manner, and with reference to different geographical contexts (Israel-Palestine, South Africa and Lebanon, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iran, Costa Rica, and Singapore), different territorial scales (national, metropolitan, and neighbourhood-level), and different disciplinary viewpoints (urban planning, architecture, urban studies, and political sciences). In some cases, the focus is more on procedural aspects, while in others is more on substantive ones (for a summary of the contents of the chapters, see Section 3). This variety is the strong point of this collection, which aims to present the diversity of viewpoints from which the topic can be analysed.

[6] See also: Payne (2002); Roy (2005); Watson (2009a and 2009b).

## 1.2 A normative point of view: planning as a fourth power?

Another point regarding the essays in the second part of this book is worth highlighting. In many cases, the central issue in the interrelation between space regulation and the political sphere is examined from an analytical-descriptive point of view (that is, as things are), as well as from a normative point of view (that is, as things ought to be). For instance, some of the authors offer insightful suggestions about the aims and scope of space regulation and moulding practices, or the role of professionals (such as planners and architects). However, it is Jeffrey Chan and Faith Wong's chapter in particular that has a prevalently normative slant, and deals explicitly and specifically with ethical problems related to planning in the Global South. Their reflections, together with the suggestions proposed by the authors of other chapters, are an important stimulus and an invitation to develop normative investigation into the relationship between space regulation and the political sphere.

In fact, this normative aspect of reasoning is particularly important. It is a thorny issue, one which raises a number of tricky ethical questions and which is seldom examined with precise reference to the Global South. Hence many matters remain to be examined in more depth. Among them, we would mention the following: what are the normative and deontological consequences of the political character of space regulation as regards planning? Should a planner act as a 'political activist', i.e. attempt to promote specific values (such as equity, social justice, and participation) in the planning process and outcomes?

This question has usually been answered in the affirmative.[7] From a theoretical point of view, the active political role of a planner is manifest in two ways: by promoting a certain substantive idea of a good city and a good society and by promoting a certain procedural concept of good planning. The former perspective has been taken, for instance, by John Friedmann and Susan Fainstein: as we know, according to Friedmann (1987), the central aim of (radical) planning is the constitution of an alternative order; in Fainstein's view (2000), the central aim of planning is the definition and achievement of the 'just city'. The role of the planner is to use planning to propose, promote, and implement the values and characteristics that should pertain to a good city and society in his or her opinion. Two examples of the latter perspective are John Forester's (1989) communicative planning perspective and Patsy Healey's (1997)

[7] See, for instance: Baum (1983); Howe (1980 and 1994); Howe and Kaufman (1979 and 1981); Krumholz (1982).

collaborative planning perspective. In this case, a specific *telos*[8] to be implemented and attained (e.g. a certain idea of the good city) is not proposed, but rather a certain path or process that is considered to be good from a procedural point of view is advocated.[9]

Regardless of the approach that is actually adopted, there is a shared idea that planning is an essentially normative discipline: the aim of planning is to define, promote, and attain some preferred state of affairs or some preferred values (democracy, social justice, participation, or equity, for example).[10] From this point of view, planning almost overwhelms politics: it self-defines the values and the substantive idea of a good city (and a good society) to be attained, and in so doing, it is made independent of politics (Chiodelli, 2012) – if we consider politics to be the democratically legitimate arena in which (authoritative) decisions on the substantive idea of a good city and society are to be taken.

These interpretations of planning are widespread: they were born and developed in the Global North, but spread quickly across the Global South. In fact, it is with reference to the cities of the Global South that these theories appear to be more current and necessary, due in part to the magnitude of spatial injustice, the spread of miserable living conditions, and elitist and authoritarian approaches to urban policies. For all these reasons, the arguments in favour of planning that promotes democracy, participation, equity, and social justice seems to be fairly obvious.

In our opinion, however, these interpretations raise a number of problems that are not always dealt with, so that it is useful to highlight them. They refer, for instance, to professional ethics (deontology), and to the relation between legitimate political power and the technical sphere. In the paragraphs that follow, we will offer some brief notes on this issue, our aim being to further enhance the stimuli offered by the authors whose chapters are included in this book. We should make it clear that our doubts do not relate to the above-mentioned values in themselves (from a personal point of view, we share them); nevertheless, we are not completely convinced that it is legitimate to promote them through planning.

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[8] From the Greek *τέλος*: end, purpose.

[9] In some cases, the authors state that a good process can also ensure good substantive outcomes.

[10] See, for instance, Campbell and Marshall (1999: 476): 'The challenge for planning theorists, as others, is to find a way of giving prominence to universal values such as equity, environmental sensitivity and social justice'. See also Campbell (2002: 286): 'planning is fundamentally about ethical judgment, with and for others, made through just institutions – it is *about an idea of value*'.

## 2. The role of the planner

### 2.1 Legitimacy constraints: The problem of delegation[11]

Where a planner is a professional working for a public authority (such as a municipality), his/her client (that is, the principal) is represented by a political power,[12] i.e. by political delegates elected democratically.[13] Land use planning is a branch of government *lato sensu*. From a theoretical point of view, planning can be interpreted as a means of translating a political power's decisions with regard to space into 'territorial facts'. One could make the claim that planning is the technical (that is, unintentional) tool of political intentionality; as a consequence, the planner is a technician who is *at the service* of the will of the political power: 'planners, as any professional group, are not the good-willed change agents of society. Instead, they are civil servants or servants to interest organizations and private companies that pay their salaries and expect them to promote their interests' (Flyvbjerg, 1996: 386).[14]

In fact, the relationship between politics and technique always rests explicitly or implicitly on delegation. Politics must delegate to a technician or to a technical-administrative branch in order to realise its will in terms of policies (see Bendor et al., 2001); when spatial policies are at stake,

[11] In this section we only consider legitimacy questions related to the interpretation of the planner as a political activist. However, effectiveness, methodological, and logical-epistemological problems exist as well; see, for instance: Brand and Gaffikin (2007), Huxley and Yiftachel (2000), Hillier (2003), Mantysalo (2002).

[12] As well known, elected representatives are merely the formal representation of political power. In reality, a number of stakeholders concur (sometimes formally, but usually informally) in the definition of political choices (see e.g. Flyvbjerg [1998 and 2002] for an example related to urban planning). This does not alter the fact that in these cases, too, the principal is represented by institutional political bodies: they have formal power to decide (and they are formally accountable for their decisions).

[13] In this text, we refer to countries with democratic political systems – although, of course, this is not the case with all the countries in the Global South. It is also worth emphasising that our reflections do not refer to any specific institutional and legislative system; they are conducted at a theoretical level.

[14] This means accepting that there is a distinction between politics and technicians/administrators (that is, between principals and agents, and between decision and execution). This question is much debated. As we know, in practice there is always a large overlap between the political sphere and the technical sphere; this overlap cannot be a complete one, however, and actors in one sphere cannot take over a function that is particular and essential to those in the other (Svara, 2001 and 2008).

politics delegates to a planner (or to a planning structure). It is important to stress that the rationale behind delegating is a legitimate expectation of effectiveness: principals expect that the outcomes of their delegation to technicians will be consistent with their wishes and will maximise their expected utility, so that a specific planning choice will satisfy the political reasons behind it. As a consequence, because the fundamental assumption is that 'the preferences of agents potentially diverge from those of political principals and that agents possess more expertise than these principals […], the basic prediction is that […] the principals will delegate more authority to agents as their policy uncertainty or need for expertise increases and that they will delegate more authority as either their political uncertainty (i.e., uncertainty about agent preferences) or the divergence of agent preferences from their preferences decreases' (Lavertu and Weimer, 2009: 96). This is the so-called 'ally principle'.

Regardless of the specific way in which it functions, the mere existence of delegation has significant implications on a planner's deontology. Delegation implies a certain level of freedom for planners in their actions and choices – and this freedom is increased by the fact that planning is a social (i.e. soft) science: there are multiple and diverse spatial choices that will attain the same goal, but they are not equivalent, for instance, from a distributive point of view. This freedom raises a number of thorny ethical questions. Is it legitimate from an institutional point of view for the planner to make choices that diverge from the will of the political principals and their interests? For example, is it legitimate for a planner to implement certain urban transformations or to select certain procedures that directly or indirectly foster values and aims that diverge from political principals' values and aims? What is the appropriate degree of autonomy for a planner? Is there room for a planner's personal values in his or her professional activity?

Generally speaking, one possible answer to these questions runs as follows. Because we have just mentioned that, from a theoretical point of view, a planner may be considered merely to be a spatial translator of political decisions, we might infer that he or she should attempt as far as possible to be a mere tool at the service of the political will. This means, for instance, that planners' spatial proposals and choices should be selected in a manner distant from, and unrelated to, their personal values (it is to be noted that this clashes with the planning conception of many planners, as observed for instance by Howe and Kaufman, 1979).[15] If we

[15] As we know, it is impossible in daily practice to act in a perfectly neutral manner – see, for instance, Howe and Kaufman (1981: 266): 'values are like a jack-in-the-box, popping up at different times, often unconsciously and unceremoniously'. It

accept this point of view, we can take the position that the main ethical constraints for planners are deontological-procedural, but not teleological-substantive (Hoekveld and Needham, 2013). For instance, planners have no constraints that relate directly to the so-called 'public interest', or to values such as social justice and equity (these are teleological-substantive constraints), but they do have constraints relating to such areas as professional competence, accountability, or integrity (these are deontological-procedural constraints). Another deontological-procedural constraint is the 'commitment not to deceive':[16] a planner must not mislead or cheat his or her principal (the political power), even where, say, this deceit would lead to greater equity and social justice with regard to a certain land-use plan. At the same time, a planner must not allow political power to use his or her technical arguments in order to deceive the public, as happens, for instance, when technical reasons are presented by politicians as if they are decisive for the purposes of public policy choice, where the aim is to conceal the political rationale on which the policy actually rests – however, technical knowledge itself never intrinsically and automatically generates a policy.[17]

## 2.2 The boundaries of a planner's field of action

What we have just argued might seem counterintuitive. This is particularly evident if we consider many cities in the Global South. Here, spatial injustice (poverty, marginalisation, and segregation) is widespread and sometimes dramatic, and planning often contributes towards producing and strengthening these conditions. Why should planners not fight them actively? Why should planners not be political activists who fight the 'system' from within by seeking to foster substantive values in which they believe while serving a public administration (even if these values are different from the values and will of the political principals)? The rationale behind our answer is that, within a democratic system, a planner is not legitimated to make significant value choices in the place of (that is, at variance with) a political power: no one has elected him/her, and so s/he has no legitimacy to violate the 'ally principle' and exceed the boundaries of his delegation. We agree with Davidoff and Reiner (1962: 108) when they state:

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seems, however, that it might at least be possible to limit the role of own personal values to a certain degree.

[16] For the relevance of deception in planning, see Flyvbjerg (1996) and Baum (1996).

[17] If this were to happen, the planner should resign and report the fact publicly.

> 'he cannot, as an agent of his clients, impose his own ideas of what is right or wrong. […] Our contention rests on the thesis that goals are value statements, that value statements are not objectively verifiable, and, therefore, that the planner, by himself, cannot reasonably accept or reject goals for the public. This is crucial: we maintain that neither the planner's technical competence nor his wisdom entitles him to ascribe or dictate values to his immediate or ultimate clients'.

Does this mean that there is no room for a planner's personal ethical and political values and beliefs? This is unquestionably an intractable issue (on this topic, see, for instance, Marcuse, 1976; Howe, 1994). In essence, we might make the claim that a planner who takes ethical values into serious account can only legitimately follow two paths. First, s/he can choose a kind of ataraxia (*ἀταραξία*), or value impassiveness: as a mere translator of a political will, s/he can serve a political power with whose purpose, values, and choices he does not agree (of course, in so doing, he must be aware that he is contributing to the functioning of an institution that produces outcomes s/he believes to be unjust). Second, if a planner cannot relinquish his/her values, the only solution is to serve principals who share his/her values and purpose – for instance, a political authority or a stakeholder group with which s/he is sympathetic. *Tertium non datur*: in no case does his/her legitimate social role lie in a capacity to change a power system that s/he considers to be unjust covertly, from within. A planner's function is to provide technical arguments to transform value (i.e. political) wishes into 'spatial facts'. S/he is *at the service* of the political sphere: s/he can offer technical arguments that will help politicians take a certain decision, s/he can put it into practice, or s/he can criticise it. However, these technical arguments in themselves do not annul the non-technical (e.g. ethical or political) components inherent in any spatial policy or decision. These non-technical components are outside the planner's 'jurisdiction' (they are not usually delegated to planners, and in any case, they *do not have to be* delegated to them) because they are a prerogative (that is, a right and a duty) of elected officials.

If a planner wishes to play an active political role (for example, to promote certain substantive values), s/he can do so only after having removed his/her 'technical uniform': s/he can act like a political activist only as an ordinary citizen. If not, s/he may support a mistaken idea: a technician (such as a planner) who uses technical arguments to support a policy may suggest that there are certain *decisive* technical reasons behind

the choice of a specific policy, but this is false in nearly every case.[18] Politics is not *téchne* (τέχνη): there are always reasons that outweigh technical arguments in the selection of a specific policy. The notion of a planner acting as a political activist has grave negative outcomes: it obfuscates the substantive and procedural politicality of space regulation, because it creates the illusion that planning policies and choices can be determined entirely within the technical sphere, independently of the power sphere; on the contrary, 'power has a clear tendency to dominate rationality […]. Paraphrasing Pascal, one could say that power has a rationality that rationality does not know. Rationality, on the other hand, does not have a power that power does not know' (Flyvbjerg, 2002: 361).

## 2.3 Toward a Southern perspective

The aim of these brief reflections is not to offer a definitive solution to the thorny questions concerning the planner's role and the normative implications of the interrelation between space and politics in the Global South; their sole purpose is to highlight certain problematic issues on which we believe that there should be increased research and discussion. It is our hope that the arguments offered in this introductory chapter and in the essays that follow will make a useful contribution to this end.

In this regard, one final point should be stressed. There has been intense reflection on such topics in the Global North over the past few decades, but this reflection has now abated. By contrast, it seems to have gained momentum in (and with reference to) the Global South. Sometimes, theories born in Europe and North America are replayed in the Global South; consequently, they are frequently ill-suited to the specificities and problems that affect cities in the South.[19] Sometimes, however, new points of view arise out of the peculiarities of the Global South. It is our hope that this 'indigenous' point of view may strengthen

[18] A public policy can be 'evaluated technically' if the desire is to emphasize both the expected costs and benefits, but it cannot be 'judged technically', because the judgement on both costs and benefits will change according to the political aims. It is worth noting that this is also true from a theoretical standpoint. According to the so-called Hume's law (or ethical divisionism) there is a logical gap between descriptive statements (about how things are) and normative statements (about how things ought to be). As a consequence, is not possible to directly and consequentially derive normative statement from descriptive statements; there cannot be any logical consequentiality between fact and values. On the implications of this for planning, see Chiodelli (2012).

[19] On this topic, see for instance: Okpala (1987); Watson (2002, 2009a, and 2009b).

and establish the international debate; indeed, a southern perspective on planning might be helpful not only for coping more effectively with problems of the Global South, but also for rekindling research on these topics in the Global North as well.

## 3. Contents of the second section of the book

The second part of the book consists of six essays.

In Chapter 9, '*Transformative and Counter-Hegemonic Planning Regimes: South Africa and Lebanon*', Scott A. Bollens investigates South Africa and Lebanon, where alternative town planning regimes have emerged in response to the inadequacies and limitations of traditional state planning and regulatory apparatuses. As the author tells us, in South Africa, a planning regime that is (potentially) transformative of traditional city-building techniques emerged during the transition period following the formal end of apartheid in 1994; the discredited planning system adopted during Apartheid was supplanted by a new planning approach that sought to integrate spatial planning with social and economic development, and to include participatory and grassroots elements. This is what the author calls *transformative planning*: that is, a planning regime that seeks to enact changes in both the processes and outcomes of traditional urban planning through the internal reform of institutions and processes. With reference to Lebanon, the author finds that urban planning has been utilised by Hezbollah to bypass and counter the traditional state apparatus. Hezbollah is a military and political organisation with a religious (Shiite Muslim) imprint, which presents itself and acts as an alternative to the Lebanese state. Since the 2006 33-Day War against Israel, Hezbollah, which has always criticised the development model promoted by the government for urban reconstruction in Beirut, has undertaken on its own terms the rebuilding of the Haret Hreik suburb that was destroyed by Israeli attacks. In this case, Hezbollah has used urban redevelopment as a 'powerful tool in shaping spatial and social geographies, delimiting its territory, and consolidating its claims for power with facts on the ground'. This is a case of what the author calls *counter-hegemonic planning*, in which urban planning is used by a political organisation as a means to oppose the authority of the state and to strengthen its power and territorial control. By analysing the characteristics, limitations, and potential of transformative and counter-hegemonic planning, Scott Bollens shows that in many areas of the Global South, alternative planning regimes might arise as an antidote to the failures of traditional planning.

In the following chapter, '*Informality as Control: The Legal Geography of Colonisation of the West Bank*', Erez Tzfadia deals with informality from a point of view different to the traditional approach that usually emerges in the urban studies field: he does not analyse informality with reference to urban poverty and the self-provision of economic resources; rather, he associates informality with control. He argues that in certain situations (for instance, in colonial contexts where there is a clash between the rule of law and the logic of ethno-nationalism to the extent that the rule of law cannot adequately serve the ethnocratic state's need for social and territorial control), informality may serve as a means of control and domination. The author refers his analysis to the Israeli-Palestinian context, and focuses in particular on the case of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Erez Tzfadia shows that the rule of law has customarily been used by the Israeli authorities to provide the appearance that human rights are being protected. However, at the same time, there are exceptions and violations that are permitted and practised by the Israeli authorities to achieve their aims. This is the case, for instance, of the situations of 'emergency' and 'exception' (in the name of national security) used by Israel in the first decade after the occupation of the West Bank in 1967 to justify the establishment of Jewish settlements. It is also the case of the 'patching' strategy[20] implemented by the Israeli authorities between 1979 and 1993 to strengthen their control over the West Bank. And it is again the case of the more recent 'informality as control' strategy which has characterised Israeli actions in the West Bank since 1993. Erez Tzfadia focuses his attention in particular on this third strategy, and he dissects all its aspects (such as the methods used to establish outposts; public discourse on them; and the ways in which they are covertly supported by the bureaucracy, politicians, and the judiciary). In so doing, he highlights the fact that informality functions as a toolbox for social and territorial control based on an ethno-national rationale: 'the co-existence of formality and informality is the basic structure of territorial control. This co-existence enables the bureaucratic and political systems to maintain territorial control based on a manoeuvring between "illegal-legal" planning, patching processes, and informal possibilities. This manoeuvring enables an extension of rights for those who serve the territorial interests of the State (i.e. Jewish settlers), and the curtailment of territorial rights for those perceived to be the "enemy"'.

Next, in their chapter entitled '*Sovereignty, Planning and Gray Space: Illegal Construction in Sarajevo and Jerusalem*', Olivier Legrand and

[20] The 'patching' strategy consisted of addressing any threat to the colonial order by reference to a different legal system, to the benefit of the Israeli State.

Oren Yiftachel address the relationship between urban planning and informality with reference to Sarajevo and Jerusalem, two cities characterised by high levels of tension among antagonistic urbanised ethno-national groups. In particular, the authors focus on the so-called grey spaces:[21] that is, the liminal zones between legality and illegality. In analysing the two cities, the authors show that there can be different forms of grey spaces as well as that different meanings are attributed to them. In fact, grey spaces can be legal but unplanned: this is the case, for instance, of Sarajevo Canton, which is prevalently inhabited by Bosnian Muslims, and where public authorities have conducted extensive campaigns to regularise post-war illegal urban development without providing services and infrastructure. Conversely, grey spaces can be illegal but planned: this is the case of East Sarajevo, which is prevalently inhabited by Bosnian Serbs, and where despite the lack of proper building permits, urban development has been substantively planned. Grey spaces are also multiple, not only in terms of form, but also in terms of meaning, as the authors show when dealing with the case of Jerusalem. In any event, grey spaces are always used to impose (or maintain) the demographic and spatial hegemony of the dominant ethnic group, but this use may take various forms. For example, with reference to the Ir David National Park area, grey space is a source of empowerment for Jewish groups (through the archaeological activities of the Elad Foundation); with reference to the Silwan neighbourhood, grey spaces are a source of disfranchisement for Palestinian Jerusalemites; in the Shu'fat refugee camp and Kafr 'Aqab (two Palestinian municipal areas that have been excluded *de facto* from Jerusalem by the construction of the 'separation barrier'), grey spaces are more than a source of disfranchisement – they have become spaces of abandonment. The analysis of grey spaces proposed by Olivier Legrand and Oren Yiftachel is particularly interesting because it serves to underline that sovereignty and urban planning are not monolithic and autonomous spheres, but are multifaceted, and in a continuous and variable relationship, producing complex and highly differentiated urban regimes.

In the following chapter, '*Politics of Urban Form. Architecture of Tehran (1921-1953)*', Hamed Khosravi also addresses the interrelation between urban space and sovereignty. Unlike Olivier Legrand and Oren Yiftachel, however, he focuses on architecture, and in particular on modern architecture in Tehran between 1921 and 1953 (the Pahlavi period). His aim is to show that the urban projects implemented during those decades can be interpreted as acts through which political intent was materialised and enacted. From both a political and a cultural point of

[21] For an examination of 'grey spaces', see Yiftachel (2008).

view, the Pahlavi period represented a break with the previous traditional and religious background of Iranian society: the project of modernity was imposed on Iran. Hamed Khosravi's essay shows that this modernisation project was also pursued through a re-shaping of the urban fabric. The author stresses that this is evident not only from analysis of the shape of the Teheran Master Plan of 1937 or the content of the new building regulations; it is also clear if we analyse the new language of architecture used by the state authority in projects for new administrative buildings (which were built using a modern, monumental, and luxurious architectural language to represent formally the state's power to administer the life of the Iranian population). And it is also clear if we analyse the architectural language used by the emerging middle class to oppose the oppressive power of the state in their (counter-) housing development projects. Reading the history of Tehran as a cycle of projects, conflict and counter-projects, Hamed Khosravi suggests that the relationship between architecture and political power is 'a paradigmatic example in which the architecture of the city performs as a machine charged with the task of not simply framing political subjects (citizens), but enabling an ideological interaction through action and reaction, movement and resistance'.

In the following chapter, '*Unravelling Spaces of Representation through Insurgent Planning Actions*', Ignacio Castillo Ulloa focuses on the interpretation of spatial practices as 'insurgent planning actions'. Basing his analysis on Henri Lefebvre's trialectic of space, he shows that spatial practices are able to move planning from the 'representation of space' typical of traditional professional planning (which subjugates what is lived and perceived by people to what is foreseen by planners) to 'spaces of representation' (that is, the spaces of a dwelling, vibrant and alive, created by the inhabitants through their direct actions according to their conceptions and desires). In this chapter, to illustrate his thesis, the author refers to the case of Paso Ancho, an urban community in southern San José, Costa Rica, where a coalition of citizens' groups (Comité Patriótico) has carried out a series of actions to develop the neighbourhood cooperatively according to the desires, needs, and views of its inhabitants. In doing so, the inhabitants involved transformed their neighbourhood physically and socially, and they were able to consider themselves as citizens fully capable of altering their living conditions despite painstaking attempts to exclude them. This case study permits Ignacio Castillo Ulloa to claim that if spatial practices are counter-hegemonic, transgressive, imaginative, and spatial, they can be interpreted as a form of insurgent planning that allows 'ordinary people, as the example of Paso Ancho

demonstrates, [to] produce spaces within the crannies – and even in spite – of official planning processes'.

The concluding chapter of this second section of the book is Jeffrey Chan and Faith Wong's '*The Contestation of Space and Ethics in Singapore: a Case of Dirty Hands in Planning*'. In their essay, the authors focus on the ethical issues that arise from the nexus between politics and planning in the Global South-East, and in particular on the awkward question of 'dirty hands' (that is, performing an immoral act for the sake of the greater good). They analyse five cases in Singapore, where projects for developing care facilities for the city's growing elderly population have been objected to by residents. Through examination of the planning decision-making process enacted in these cases, they highlight the limitations of the utilitarian paradigm that guides town planning in Singapore, and make the claim that it is indifferent to questions of equitable distribution and spatial justice, which 'can only lead planners further into the territory of dirty hands, where aggregate gains are attained at the expense of incalculable qualities, such as moral worthiness, virtuousness, or justice'. Jeffrey Chan and Faith Wong therefore call for a different planning paradigm to be pursued, especially in situations of power imbalances. They suggest the implementation of co-planning: that is, a planning process characterised by a real, active involvement on the part of stakeholders in the early stages of policy making. In their opinion, only co-planning 'could avoid the worst of dirty hands not only because it is an inclusive planning process, but co-planning can also render the contestation of ethics between stakeholders less tacit and more public'.

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